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Introduction
Public-Private Partnership is a variation of privatisation in which parts of a service run solely by the public sector are provided through a partnership between the government and at least one private company. Unlike a full privatisation scheme, in which the new venture is expected to function like any other business, the government continues to participate in some way. Since recent years, this kind of privatisation is discussed controversial. Literature which is linked with this modern aspect of privatisation offers case studies, financing methods and shows a lot of problems which occur in the conversion from theory to practice 1 . Interesting insights are offered by the literature of integration. Hart and Grossman throw attention towards the role of residual control rights which have an important impact on decisions about integration. They mention the existence of incomplete contracts and unforeseeable events and highlight the importance of ownership.
Hart and Moore develop a foundation for the incomplete contracts approach 2 .
Property rights allow the owner to be in a much better bargaining position, if contingencies arise that are not fixed within a contract. Ownership strengthens the owner and provides incentives to do investments, because he reaps more of the investments in comparison to his partner who gave up his control rights after an This brief outline of the recent literature of privatisation 7 shows that incomplete contracts, asymmetric information and incentive structures play an important role when advantages of privatisation and private ownership are examined. The objective in the following thesis is the development of optimal rules for PublicPrivate Partnerships from a constitutional perspective.
The research background and the conception of the state have an impact on the choice of rules. Therefore it is important to clarify which research background should be chosen for the examination of a normative guideline for PPP.
The research background
While the neoclassic economists designed the politician as a benevolent agent, appearing as an omniscience of the scientific observer, 8 the public choice theory and constitution economics assume a self interested agent to foster the political understanding and correct the results caused by the misguiding use of the benevolent dictator. 9 While the traditional neoclassic and Keynesian market economics viewed rules and institutions as given data, more and more questions aroused concerning institutional topics. will also be designed in a way that they restrict a revenue raising leviathan and will ensure that a procedure for PPPs is being chosen so that it is vital for the aggregated income. The constitutional approach provides an adequate framework that allows clarifying how the process of PPPs may be improved by constitutional restrictions. Improvement refers to the outcomes which are preferred by the citizens. The rules which are to be determined by analyse refer to a given governmental behaviour. As the voting mechanism does not guarantee an appropriate restriction of governmental power, the unanimous agreement is applied as the only way to make state activities result in real improvements.
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21 See for example Vanberg, 2006, pp. 5. 22 See Buchanan, 1977, pp. 22. 23 See Brennan, Buchanan, (1988 (1980 Then, the agent is not acting in favour of the preferences of the citizens. In a very extreme occurrence the citizens loose any control on the agent which appears in this characteristic as a leviathan and get exploited by their sovereign. The approach of mechanism design applies in the context of principal agent problems.
Knowing that the agents will not reveal their knowledge truthfully, the principal gives them an incentive to do so. This leads to a trade off that may end up with inefficient allocations. This approach assumes that the principal chooses a mechanism that maximises his expected utility. The mechanism design principal agent theory concerns primarily in period informal asymmetries and assumes historical grown structures as given, which contrasts the principal agent theory.
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The analytical task is to link the relationship of the constitutional approach and the neoclassic contract theory which is based on the principal agent theory, the property rights theory and the transaction cost theory. 28 The constitution is designed in a way that the state follows a practice for PPP that is in his own interest, as well as in the interest of the citizenry. Hence, the constitution has to be 25 As the agents knows more about the task that he has to fulfil and about his actions, abilities and preferences. 26 See Neumärker, 1995 , pp. 23. 27 See Fuldenberg, Tirole, 1991 See Neumärker, 1995 , who indexes the topic of a constitution of public expenditure in the theoretical context and highlights the relationship of the constitutional approach and the neoclassical contract theory. original game, which orders outcomes according to fairness. This ideology can be compared to a pre-play communication. The players in the non cooperative game comply with the fairness principle although they do not have monetary incentives to do so. The players expect reciprocity which conforms to the constitutional ideology to be a utility source per se.
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The next section will introduce Harts model. Hart, an economist that made a name in particular within the framework of the contract theory calls in his paper
Incomplete contracts and public ownership: remarks and an application to public-private partnership the attention away from financing aspects, there to the costs of the contract.
In a latter section the PPP context will be applied in the framework of Grimalda and Sacconi and it will be examined if a constitutional stage will derive appropriate normative guidelines for PPPs.
Basics
Hart refers to the theory of the firm that implicates incomplete contracts. That means suboptimal outcomes result out of the fact that uncertain events can occur in future and can hardly be fixed in a contract. Within the privatisation literature there are generally complete contracts assumed. Consequently, suboptimal outcomes result from moral hazard and asymmetric information. When for every decision a complete and an incomplete contract are taken as a basis, two things will become obvious. The incentives for the agents on one hand and the role of the property rights on the other hand which have an impact on the investments. In the case of two vertical integrated firms, the property rights should be distributed in a way, that there will be an optimal trade-off between two effects: If firm A acquires firm B, A has more residual control rights, hence a greater bargaining power when uncontracted contingencies arise. Because A earns higher returns on his investment, A has the incentive to invest more. B is going to invest less, because his bargaining power is lower. Such a trade-off does not occur in the privatisation context. Hart uses prisons as an example, to show the difficult nature which arises within public and private ownership. 31 A manager will probably make more investments. However, he does investments which will reduce the quality of the object, for example, if he installs electrified fences to reduce the amount of required guards. But there is the incentive to do investments which will increase the quality of the object, as well. To decide whether public or private ownership is preferable one has to focus on the impacts of the two mentioned effects. This is crucial for the second part of Harts paper, in which he introduces a In the first-best, i and e are chosen to maximise the net benefit.
Within unbundling Hart concludes that the builder will neither internalise the benefit B, nor the costs C. 0 = = e i means, that he invests the optimal amount of e, but less of i. Conventional procurement is preferable, when the quality of building can easily be specified within a contract, but not the properties of service.
An underinvestment in i is not a serious issue. Under these conditions, an overinvestment in e under PPP may be more severe.
In case of bundling the builder does not internalise the benefit, but he internalises the costs. He invests more in i, but still not enough. He invests too much in e. PPP is preferable, when the quality of service can easily be specified in a contract and if the performance is measurable. An underinvestment in i at conventional provision would have much more negative consequences than an overinvestment in e. 33 We will now switch to an approach that is based on the idea of social preferences. Afterwards it will be elaborated if linking both concepts can lead to implications for rules for PPP. [ ]
This formal setting will be applied in a production game. 37 In games, roles, rules, outcomes, strategies and pay-offs offer a framework to model situations. The main purpose of games is to solve complicated quantitative problems. 38 The participating agents are an entrepreneur E, a worker W and a consumer C. The agents E,W produce a good, which is consumed by C. C´s pay-off is affected by the others actions, whereas E´s and W´s pay-offs are not affected by the workers action. So the consumer C is a dummy variable. 39 The commitments of E and W have an impact on the quality of the good they produce. The players have two different opportunities: either they are on a par with a profit-orientated market standard, or they permit improvement in the quality of the good, which triggers extra costs, which have to be borne by the agents themselves. If the worker decides to a high degree of commitment to produce a product of high quality, he will earn a relatively low wage. Alternatively, he has the opportunity to realise a relatively high wage w , if he decides to give a low contribution. The result in this non cooperative game is a good of low quality. commit to produce a good of high quality, there will result a surplus s for the consumer. If just one of the agents provides such an activity, the surplus is only a fraction δ of s. If none of the agents contributes such an action the utility of the consumer will be 0. For the production game, the following restrictions are binding:
The production game will be played twice. The consumer's surplus will be neglected in round I. The pay-offs refer to the worker and the entrepreneur.
Hence, the agents will behave selfish.
W E l l ; is a dominant Nash equilibrium. None of the agents has the incentive to do a quality improving action. In the following, the game will be played with the consumers: ;s can be interpreted that the agents have an ex-ante arrangement. They have chosen a principle, which is a rational of from all points of view. Fair distribution might be a principle, which all three involved parties would accept. In this pre play phase all agents are rational. They neither know their names, nor their roles in the game. The core of the contractarian approach is that a fair distribution can be achieved through a rational agreement.
Here another idea explains the outcome. For the worker and the entrepreneur are fair distributions of utility a source of utility per se. In the following section this formal Model of Grimalda and Sacconi will be used, to examine, if Harts conclusions change, if the participating agents are multiple-preferences based or if they are engaged in a hypothetical pre play bargaining game. Further, it will be investigated, how optimality can be reached.
Melting together both concepts
The term, which defines conformity with the normative principle, will be applied [ ] 
The production game will be played twice. First, the utility of the consumer will be neglected. In the second game, his utility will enter the game. In the following section we will analyse the case of bundled provision.
PPP (bundling)
The state fixes the quality of service within a contract. The builder has the choice, weather he provides the service himself, or if he subcontracts the service. He receives a payment which corresponds to his costs:
Because the builder is responsible for providing the service, he has the incentive to internalise the costs of service provision. Consequently, the level of the utility maximising wage changes, because he does more of productivity increasing investments i´, but also more of quality shading investments e´. Another way to explain the occurrence of the first-best solution is reciprocal behaviour. The expectation that other players will comply with the normative principle as well, is a source of utility per se. In Harts context, that means, the builders utility increases if he beliefs that the operator engages in a good prison operation. In the following section, the model will be applied, to show how the choice that leads to an optimal outcome can be rational. First, it will be applied in the context of conventional provision.
After introducing the Nash Welfare function, it is obvious, that the dominant strategy makes sense. The Welfare function is defined as follows:
defines the reservation utility of the agents they can obtain when the bargaining process breaks down. In the present context, the reservation utility is zero. 43 If the builders and operators pay-offs are inserted in this function, the following values result. Their values determine which strategy is a rational one. The higher the gain in prisoner's surplus, if both contribute for a good prison operation, the more probable they will choose E B l l ; . Which are the implications of this outcome? In the context of a NPO one can estimate in which branches they occur. They are in sectors, where a joint effort results in a higher effort for the consumer. That means, the gain in surplus in high enough, so that a high contribution is being compensated.
Conventional provision
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How can a pay-off matrix be modified, so that the participants choose a strategy which implies optimal outcomes? Equations (1) and (2) are a starting point to show that in E B l l ; is a psychological equilibrium. Based on the utility function (3) whereas the Nash Welfare function is a normative principle, an outcome can be optimal, when the ideal utility is sufficiently higher than the material utility. The operator's utility consists of the relatively low wage and the compliance to the normative principle:
(4)
In the following section will be examined, if the operator has the incentive to deviate from his strategy B h . When the agent deviates from a certain outcome he has to take into account that others expectations are coherent with his performing the action leading to that outcome. He can estimate the possible changes in his comprehensive utility deriving from not conforming to these expectations. 
B h f
The workers conformity with the normative principle must change. If the builder is going to perform E h with the probability of one, the following values for the Nash Function result: 
The ideal utility of the operator is now smaller than in (4), because he has to bear the psychological costs for the facts, that he is not reciprocating the action of the builder. The builder might feel guilty, knowing the builder did everything to comply with the normative principle. But this outcome can be interpreted in another way, too. The operator might feel guilty, because he did not fulfil the expectations of the builder. To ensure, that the operator acts in a quality improving way, the following restriction must be fulfilled:
This condition states that the weight attributed to the ideal utility must be sufficiently high to compensate the loss of material utility caused by not performing the best action. This implicates an outcome in which both agents drive a strategy which implicates the highest utility for the third (dummy) player. This strategy is contradictory to the forecast for selfish agents. One would expect, that they would act in a way to maximise their own utility. The sufficient condition for such equilibrium is a sufficiently high appreciation for the normative principle and the belief that the other agent acts reciprocal.
Grimalda and Sacconi examine, if a psychological equilibrium can exists, even if both agents act selfish. 45 Hence, the operator derives material utility:
The operator cannot gain an increase of utility from deviating from this outcome.
He beliefs, the builder will act as follows:
Hence, there is no incentive to act contrary to his self interest. Other strategies would lead to an outcome that would be worse. The same consideration holds for the builder. According to Grimalda and Sacconi, there As the purpose of this work is to examine a framework for the Constitutional Regulation of Public-Private Partnerships, an adequate laboratory experiment might offer a broad insight of the attitudes of players when they act in a PPP environment, such as risk sensitivity, preferences regarding the utility of several outcomes etc. As roles, rules, strategies and pay-offs govern the PPP procedures it is important modelling them in games to identify the failures and problems of PPP 50 . The identification of suitable games is a challenge in the following part of this work.
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48 See Grimalda, Sacconi, 2002, pp. 271. 49 This assumption is problematic as it deviates from the homo oeconomicus assumption. 50 See Scharle, 2002, pp. 229. 51 For a detailed elaboration of a constitution for PPP, see Jamil, forthcoming.
Those results can provide a basis on which recommendations for constitutional rules can be made on. In this context, it is a crucial question, which rules the citizens accept and how rules have to be designed so that they are self enforcing for the political decision maker.
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It has to be examined whether political decision makers have incentives to prefer PPP to traditional procurement and therefore have to be restricted.
Harts approach can be expanded and so offer insights in the frame of incentive 
